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Developments in Decumulation: 
The Role of Annuity Products in Financing Retirement 
 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
 
  Driven by the prospect of a global aging boom, researchers and policymakers throughout 
the developed world have devoted substantial effort to exploring what motivates household asset 
accumulation patterns.  It is during the accumulation phase that a society seeks to build up 
resources adequate to finance retirement.  More remains to be learned about this process, but even 
less is known about what happens to people later in life, during which they are confronted with the 
need to decumulate their resources in an orderly manner in retirement. To understand this 
decumulation process better along with the factors that influence it, this paper explores a particular 
financial tool that helps protect against key financial risks at the end of life.  Specifically, I 
examine the role of the life annuity, a financial contract in which the purchaser exchanges a certain 
sum of money for a continuous stream of benefits until he dies.   The insurer, or annuity provider, 
pools longevity risk across all contractholders and is thus able to offer longevity insurance for the 
customer population. 
  Financial contracts that pay off in the event of survival have been in existence for 
centuries, with the tontines devised under Louis XIV’s reign and life annuities appearing in 
Europe as early as the 1300’s.
1   In modern times, life annuities have become a substantial 
component of the life insurance market, but only a few of the products labeled annuities are, in 
fact, “true” life annuities. For instance in the United States, purchases of life annuities totaled 
almost $120 billion in 1999, but the vast majority of the market consists of variable annuities 
rather than products paying out income for life (Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky, 
                                                 
1 One famous German tontine, that of Gotha in 1752, has been called the “perfect illustration of rococo finance”.  In 
exchange for a purchase price, the plan promised surviviors a fixed income of 3% per year plus a variable amount 





  In the UK and Australia, annuity markets also appear relatively 
small (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2000; Murthi, Orszag and Orszag, 1999; Doyle, Mitchell and 
Piggott, 2001).  Recent interest in annuity markets has come from Latin America, resulting from 
more than a dozen countries having converted their pay-as-you-go national defined benefit (DB) 
pensions into mandatory funded defined contribution (DC) pensions (Mitchell and Barretto, 1997).  
Similarly, European pension reforms now underway are demanding that similar attention be paid 
to these insurance markets as well (Blake 1999; Disney 2000; Disney and Johnson 2000; 
European Commission 1997) 
  Under a DC pension plan, retirees are typically offered a range of choices regarding how to 
convert their accumulated assets into retirement payouts. Usually the plan offers a portion of the 
money as a lump-sum, and may also provide an option to disburse some funds as either a periodic 
payment or an annuity.  Perhaps inevitably, whenever annuities come to play a key role in a 
nation’s retirement system, questions come up regarding how these products should be structured 
and priced, and the extent to which governments should supervise and regulate the market for 
these products.  For example these debates surfaced in the most recent US presidential race, where 
advisers to President Bush formulated individual account defined contribution proposals that 
included annuity promises as a cornerstone (Feldstein and Ranguelova 2000).   
  In what follows, I explore lessons from research on the annuity market over the last decade 
and discuss its relevance for aging, financial markets, and government policy.  In particular I pose 
and answer the following questions: 
n  How can annuities help retirees finance retirement? 
n  What problems arise in annuity markets? 




The discussion proceeds in five sections. Section 1 summarizes the economics of annuities, while 
Section 2 sketches the methods commonly used to value annuities. Section 3 presents empirical 
results from a range of countries, and Section 4 addresses the question of how the functioning of 
these markets might be enhanced. A final section concludes.  
 
1.  Handling Retirement Wealth Decumulation 
  Many critics have decried Westerners’ inability or unwillingness to save for their own 
retirement, with the US often identified as the most spendthrift country due to its low and 
oftentimes negative saving rate. Nonetheless the strong US economy over the past 25 years has 
provided older generations with substantial wealth on hand as they look to retirement.  Thus pre-
retirement wealth for US households in their 50’s amounts to $360,000 exclusive of Social 
Security (in 1992$), with the median at $192,000 (see Table 1).  If these households retire at age 
62, their non-Social Security assets would be anticipated to amount to $438,000 on average 
($239,000 at the median). Of this total, at least $100,000 of retiree assets and perhaps more will 
have to be managed during retirement. 
Table 1 here  
1.1 Assessing the Money’s Worth of Life Annuities 
  Having found that many elderly people will have assets to spread over their retirement 
period, the next question is how people can manage their portfolios to ensure old-age economic 
security.   One way to proceed is to simply divide available retirement wealth by one’s life 
expectancy, a fractional consumption pattern known as “periodic withdrawal” sometimes found in 
pension payout schemes.  For example, Table 2 indicates that a 65-year old man could anticipate 




problem is that were a retiree to divide his age-65 retirement wealth by the number of years 
remaining to him at age 65, he would be exposed to substantial risk of exhausting his funds before 
he died. Thus a 65-year old man who would anticipate dying at age 81 still faces a one-third 
chance of living to age 85, and almost a 20% chance of surviving to age 90.  For his female 
counterpart whose expected age at death is age 85, there is almost a one-third chance of surviving 
to age 90. Hence the periodic withdrawal approach is likely to leave retirees short of funds.  
Clearly the periodic withdrawal approach does not insure a steady flow of retirement income until 
death. 
Table 2 here 
  One way to enhance retirement security is to purchase a life annuity that guarantees an 
income stream until the insured’s death.  Such a financial product provides the retiree with an 
opportunity to insure against outliving his assets, in exchange for a premium paid to an insurer. 
The insurer pools assets across those with similar longevity expectations but who then experience 
different actual survival outcomes.  In this way the life annuity provides income insurance to a 
homogenous insured retiree population. 
How valuable is a life annuity to the retiree?  A financial answer to this question can be 
ascertained by computing the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of the life income 
benefits paid to annuitants, in relation to the annuity premium cost or purchase price.  In the 
literature this is known as the “money’s worth” of the life annuity.  To illustrate the concept, we 
may assume that the product under examination is an immediate single-life annuity that pays out 
$A per period for life, in exchange for an initial purchase price (e.g. $100,000).  The payout 




the life of the annuity contract or it may be linked to some underlying real asset (which would then 
generate a real rather than a nominal annuity).  
  In the case of a nominal annuity, we follow Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown 
(1999: henceforth MPWB) in defining qa,t as the probability that an a-month-old individual who is 
alive at the beginning of month t will die during that month. Future mortality experience is 
expressed by letting Pj be the probability that someone who is 65 years old at the time when he 
purchases an annuity survives for at least j months:
 2 
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(To compute the EPDV of an annuity purchased by a 65-year-old, we need to forecast this 
individual's future mortality probabilities.  This point is taken up in the next section.) 
We denote the EPDV of a life annuity with monthly payout A purchased by an individual 
of age b as Vb(A).  This may depend on a term structure of interest rates, ik, expressing the 
nominal short rate k periods into the future:  
(2) 
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In most of our research, we use the term structure of yields on Treasury bonds to estimate the time 
series of expected future nominal short-term interest rates,
3 though we have also explored the 
sensitivity of results to flat term structures, with the discount rate given variously by the ten-year 
Treasury bond yield, the thirty-year Treasury bond yield, and the BAA corporate bond yield.  In 
addition we have evaluated the sensitivity of results to taxes, since in the US at least the federal 
                                                 
2 In practice our computations assume that no one lives beyond age 115 years; calculations are insensitive to this 
upper limit on lifespan.   
3 Nominal yields on US Treasury bonds with fixed maturities of 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30 years are used to estimate 
the term structure of expected short-term interest rates; the expected nominal short rate in each future period is 
computed as the nominal short rate that would satisfy the expectations theory of the term structure for the two adjacent 




tax treatment of annuities is quite complex, governed by specialized rules described in BMPW 
(forthcoming).
4      
   In the case of real annuities, equation (2) must be adapted to reflect the fact that the amount 
of the payout is time-varying in nominal terms but fixed in real terms.  As shown in BMP 
(forthcoming), the simplest approach is to let Ar denote the real annual payout, and to replace the 
nominal interest rates in the denominator of equation (2) with corresponding real interest rates rk.   
Hence to compute the EPDV of a real annuity the equation becomes:  
(3)   
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  The “money’s worth” of an annuity may then be specified as the ratio of the EPDV of the 
annuity’s payout stream to its purchase price.  For a nominal annuity selling for $100,000, for 
instance, the money’s worth may be expressed as Vb(An)/100,000.  These money worth ratios have 
proven useful in the literature, since they represent a currency-independent metric for comparing 
annuities across different groups, over time, and across countries. 
1.2  Equivalent Wealth Valuation: Measuring the Utility of Longevity Insurance 
Before reporting money’s worth results for a range of countries and time periods, we note 
that risk-averse consumers will value annuities more highly than the simple financial money’s 
worth approach implies. This is because people derive utility from insurance protection per se.  In 
our research we develop a metric for evaluating how a risk-averse consumer might value an 
annuity in utility terms, using the equivalent wealth concept (MPWB, 1999).  Specifically, this 
represents the amount of wealth that a consumer would need if he did not have access to an 
                                                 
4 Specifically the US tax authority specifies the expected number of years over which the annuitant can expect to 
receive benefits, T', based on the annuitant's age at the time payouts begin.  Tax law then defines an inclusion ratio 
that determines the share of annuity payments in each period that must be included in the recipient's taxable income 
until T’; after that all annuity income is subject to tax.  The inclusion ratio is designed to measure the fraction of each 




annuity market, in order to achieve the same lifetime expected utility level that he could achieve 
by using that wealth to purchase a nominal annuity.   
As developed in MPWB (1999) and summarized in Brown and Warshawsky (2000), the 
consumer is posited to maximize an expected utility function V by choosing an optimal 
consumption path {Ct} from time 0 to time T (the maximum possible lifespan), given his rate of 
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budget constraint facing the individual depends on whether he has access to a fair annuity market.  
If not, the constraint is that the present value of future consumption, discounted using the riskless 














 . If he could purchase an 














.  The difference 
between the two budget constraints is due to survival probabilities: without an annuity, the 
retiree’s actual present value of future consumption must not exceed his initial wealth, but with an 
annuity, his expected present value of consumption cannot exceed his initial wealth.   In other 
words, an annuity reduces the relative price of future consumption.  
Evaluating how much a consumer values access to an annuity requires the researcher to 
assume a functional form for the utility function and to evaluate a range of risk-aversion 
parameters. In much of our research we assume that the one-period utility function, U(Ct), exhibits 











C U , where b is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative 
risk aversion, and 1/b is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. Using the 




maximum utility that the individual could achieve by following the optimal consumption path as a 
function of all parameters. Last, we can assess the consumer’s utility gain in dollar terms, by 
computing how much additional wealth he would need if he lacked access to annuities, to make 
him as well off as if he had annuities available.  This is accomplished by finding a such that: 
( ) ( )
annuities annuities no W V W V 0 0 0 0 = a .  Here a is termed the “Annuity Equivalent Wealth ” and deriving 
it requires dynamic programming algorithms described in MPWB (1999) for the case of a single 
individual, Brown and Poterba (2000) for the case of couples, and BMP (forthcoming) for the case 
in which returns and/or inflation are uncertain. 
 
2.  Valuing Annuities in Practice   
  Moving from theory to practice, several types of data are required to value annuity 
products. These include information on actual annuity premiums and payouts, and on current as 
well as projected mortality risks. We investigate each of these in turn in this section. 
2.1 Annuity Premiums and Payouts   
  To understand how annuity markets work, it is important to obtain data on actual payouts 
for life annuities and the premiums charged for these annuity promises.  Information on average 
monthly nominal annuities for the US by sex over time appears in Table 3. Here we find, not 
surprisingly, that men can expect to receive higher payouts than women because of their shorter 
life expectancies conditional on purchase at age 65.  The table also indicates that monthly payouts 
appear to be falling in the US market over time. 
Table 3 here   
  Evidence from other countries is supportive of these findings. Information for the UK 




annuities.  Patterns are as expected. Benefit payouts for younger people are, logically, lower than 
for older people, due to the longer life expectancy for younger purchasers. Once again, payouts for 
women are below those for men. Payouts for a nominal annuity purchased at age 65 are similar in 
the UK and the US. The monthly payouts for the real benefit stream in the UK are lower than for 
the nominal annuity, again with women receiving less than men.  Average nominal payouts for 55-
year olds in two other countries with good data, Singapore and Australia, appear in Table 5. 
Tables 4 and 5 here 
2.2 Mortality Processes
5    
  To value an annuity payout for life, we must have data on the probability of the 
purchaser’s survival into the future, yet it is not a simple matter to obtain projected mortality (or 
life) tables.  This is because a mortality table is typically derived by obtaining actual data on the 
number of deaths by age and sex occurring in a given population over a specific period of time.  
The probability qx that a group member of age x will die in the next year of life is then estimated 
by either fitting a hazard model to the empirical distribution of deaths in the population, or by 
applying a smoothing algorithm to the raw maximum likelihood estimates of qx.  Then the 
smoothed estimates of qx may be used to construct a complete mortality table.  In the developed 
world, mortality is extremely rare at most ages, so a large number of lives must be observed in 
order to obtain reliable estimates.   
  A concern that arises in developing mortality projections for valuing annuities is that 
mortality processes may be heterogeneous across subgroups of the population.
  For example 
insurers worry about adverse selection, which arises when annuity purchasers are more likely than 
average to live a long time in retirement.  In this case, using mortality rates derived for the 
population as a whole would seriously overstate mortality among annuitants.  One factor that may 
                                                 




play a critical role in this context is the extent to which annuitization is optional or mandatory. For 
example in the UK, occupational pension benefits must be partly annuitized on a mandatory basis, 
so dedicated annuitant mortality tables exist in the UK for voluntary as well as compulsory 
annuitant populations (Finkelstein and Poterba, 1999; Murthi et al, 1999).  In the US, federal 
Social Security payments are by law (real) life annuities, while defined benefit company  pensions 
are usually paid out as life annuities (though lump sum cashouts are becoming more popular in 
recent years; cf Mitchell 1999).  As a consequence, US mortality tables are available for group and 
individual (retail) annuitants, as well as for the general population (BMP 2000).   
  Not only do mortality tables differ across population subgroups:  they also change over 
time.  On the whole, mortality among older people has fallen steeply in developed countries over 
the last century and this process seems likely to continue in the future.
 6  The actuarial profession 
therefore projects future mortality trends by estimating so-called period mortality tables from past 
data, and then devising separate, forward-looking, cohort mortality tables by extrapolating trends 
in mortality.   Of course, anticipated future declines in mortality built into cohort tables are only 
estimates and could be wildly in error; nevertheless, future mortality estimates are essential in 
order to value annuity benefit flows for people alive today as they age into the future.   
  There is no single universally accepted method of comparing mortality tables across 
subgroups and over time, though it is clear that selecting the “right” mortality table has a profound 
effect on the value placed on a life annuity. One perspective is provided in Figure 1, illustrating 
the distribution of expected age at death for US males conditional on surviving to age 65. The 
graph clearly illustrates that the population curve has greater mortality at younger ages, with the 
annuitant curve being shifted to the right. An obvious disadvantage of the graphical comparison is 
                                                 




that it does not provide a measure for “how far apart” the two tables might be and what financial 
difference they would make in annuity valuation. 
Figure 1 here: Distribution of Age at Death, US Male Pop vs Ann 
  Other ways to compare mortality over time and across different groups include the A/E 
(“A over E”) and the IRR measures. The first, A/E, expresses the number of deaths expected in a 
population with a given age structure using one table (“the benchmark”) and then compares that to 
the expected number of deaths in a population of the same size in a second mortality table.  When 
presented as a ratio multiplied by 100, the measure is equivalent to a ratio of the weighted average 
probabilities of death for the two mortality tables, using a specific population structure for the 
weights. In recent research (Mitchell and McCarthy, 2001) we use as the base the US Male period 











  where 
*
x q is the probability that 
an individual of age x dies according to the table in question, and  x q is the probability that an 
individual of age x dies according to the US Male period population table.  The weights,  x w , are 
set so that 65 w  = 100,000, and  ) 1 ( 1 1 - - - = x x x q w w .  
  Alternatively one could view the mortality process as akin to a mathematical discount rate, 
where if $1 of today’s money were to be divided in five years time between survivors of a group 
of one million people alive today, each individual survivor’s share would grow over time with 
mortality, just as it would with compound interest.  To compare mortality tables in this 
perspective, we may use one mortality table to solve for the internal rate of return (IRR) required 
to equate the present value of a life annuity computed using a second mortality table (at some 
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|   65 1 10.18079 where  65 65 p x-  is the probability that an 
individual alive at age 65 lives to at least age x according to the mortality table in question;  x q  is 
the probability that an individual alive at age x dies before reaching age x+1;  
%
|   65 1
r
x a
- +  is the 
present value at r percent per year of an annuity certain  paid continuously for x-65+
1/2 years;  and 
* *
65 65 x x q p ￿ -  is the probability that an individual alive at age 65 dies aged x according to US Male 
population period mortality.  This technique requires both a benchmark mortality table and an 
interest rate. Our analysis uses as a benchmark the US Male population period table and an interest 
rate of 5 percent per year, and solves for the interest rate required to equate the annuity in present 
value with some other mortality table (Mitchell and McCarthy, 2001). 
2.3 International Comparisons 
  Comparisons of US and UK mortality tables are given in Table 6, with results for 
annuitants shown in the top panel and for the population as a whole in the bottom panel.  Using 
the A/E metric, annuity mortality proves to be 10-15% below the base population group, with 
differences for men exceeding those for women. Also it is interesting to note that seemingly small 
mortality differences translate into relatively large implied internal rates of return (IRRs).  Hence 
the figure of 6.55% associated with the US male annuitant cohort mortality table may be 
compared to the 5% return assumed in valuing a $1 life annuity payable using the US male 
population period table. In other words, the lower mortality for US male annuitants can be thought 
of as using a discount rate 155 basis points above the 5 percent base rate.  In the UK, where 
mortality rates are higher for UK male compulsory annuitants, this is mathematically equivalent to 
discounting with an interest rate 100 basis points above the benchmark.  In other words, a US 




59 basis points more for women, to provide the same payout as the UK compulsory annuity 
product.    
Table 6 here 
 
3. Valuing Annuity Flows 
  Having in hand the requisite data on annuitant mortality and annuity payouts, we are now 
in a position to provide information on the financial value – money’s worth – of annuity products, 
along with their utility values for risk averse consumers. 
3.1 Empirical Results on Money’s Worth  
  Table 7 summarizes findings on money’s worth ratios from a range of US and UK studies 
on nominal annuity products that use population mortality tables.  Panel A indicates that in 
exchange for a $1 initial investment in a retail annuity product, the typical age-65 US male could 
anticipate receiving a pretax value of $0.835 from a life annuity, with the value slightly higher in a 
tax-qualified plan ($0.85).  In other words, the “loading” implied by these figures amounts to 
about 15 cents per dollar premium. Women’s longer life expectancies drive up their money’s 
worth to around 89 cents on the dollar, so the loading implied is lower, at around 11 cents.  These 
US figures are comparable to those for the UK given in Panels B and C, where loadings again 
stand at around 10-15 cents on the dollar.     
Table 6 here 
  These results would not be precisely relevant for a consumer considering whether to 
annuitize his retirement wealth voluntarily, since as demonstrated above, people buying annuities 
tend to live longer than average.  This difference, termed adverse selection, is captured in Tables 8 




tables. In the US case shown in Table 8, the male annuity purchaser could expect a benefit flow 
some 7-13 percentage points higher than would someone in the population at large.  In other 
words, the insurance load drops from 10-15 cents on the dollar to 7-9 cents on the dollar after 
correction for the differential survival rate of annuitants.  Results for men and women are quite 
similar.  Evidence for the UK, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland appears in Table 9, where once 
again the loading implied with population mortality is much attenuated by using annuitant 
mortality tables.  Indeed these annuity products appear quite valuable for annuitant purchasers, 
with estimated values close to and occasionally exceeding 1.0 in a few cases. In general, therefore, 
a financial assessment of these life annuity products indicates that (a) adverse selection explains a 
substantial portion of the load perceived by potential purchasers in the general population, and (b) 
these products are rather valuable to annuitants, though in most cases their money’s worth is still 
less than 1.0. 
Tables 8 and 9 here 
  Thus far, the discussion has focused on nominal annuities, since they tend to be the 
dominant form of annuities in much of the developed world.  Yet real annuity products are on 
offer in some countries, and it is useful to consider how to value them, since retirees presumably 
seek to preserve not only nominal but real consumption levels over the retirement period. Inflation 
is a concern in old age to the extent that even small inflation rates undermine real consumption 
paths over time.  Thus a 3.2% annual rate (the US average from 1926-97) could halve the real 
value of a nominal annuity over 22 years. To some extent, annuity sellers can offset this concern 
by means of graduated products that grow over time at some fixed rate.  On the other hand, 
inflation is a concern in retirement because of uncertainty in its realization.  Hence it is important 




product.  Of course for risk-averse consumers, the impact of inflation uncertainty would be 
expected to make real annuities even more attractive.   
  The results in Table 10 review results for real annuities on offer in the UK and the US, 
where we see that the money’s worth of a real annuity is below that for a nominal annuity. In the 
US there is only a single firm offering a real annuity, while in the UK many more insurers offer 
real products. The fact that the UK discount associated with the real annuity is smaller, on the 
order of 5 percentage points, suggest that a more active market in the products narrows price 
differentials.   
Table 10 here 
  The fact that there is any discount in the money’s worth of real versus nominal annuities 
probably indicates that at the margin nonpurchasers are unwilling to pay extra to ensure a flat real 
consumption stream during retirement.
7  This finding may challenge a widely-held view that 
pension participants should be required or encouraged to elect real life annuities in lieu of 
programmed withdrawals.  
  Another way to think about annuity values assesses money’s worth ratios for particular 
population subgroups having mortality experiences that differ from the average. Thus in the US, 
for instance, blacks tend to have higher mortality probabilities than do whites, and hispanics are 
more likely to live longer than average. Brown (1999) takes into account differential ethnic 
mortality patterns, and his results are summarized in Table 11.  He finds that US white and 
hispanic women tend to be subsidized on average when they purchase annuities, while US black 
males receive less.  In a related study, Finkelstein and Poterba (2000) find that annuity purchasers 
who buy graduated products tend to live longer than those who buy flat nominal products. 
                                                 
7 Of course it might also indicate that nonpurchasers are constrained in some way from entering the 




Table 11 here 
  What these findings imply is that differential mortality expectations influence how people 
value these life income products, and these different expectations, in turn, shape what types of 
annuity products people buy when given a choice. Despite this, or sometimes because of this, 
government policy often requires that a particular mortality table be used for purposes of pricing 
life payouts, to limit perceived adverse selection and/or discrimination against members of 
particular groups. This is the case in the UK, for example, where unisex mortality tables (using a 
blend of male and female rates) must be used for pricing pension annuities,
8 and in the US where 
annuity taxation requires that unisex tables be used to assess the taxable portion of the benefit 
(BMPW, 1999).  As a result, government policy toward mortality tables in annuity pricing tends to 
generate a degree of cross-subsidization, if the product purchase is mandatory, and exacerbates 
adverse selection, if the product purchase is voluntary. 
3.2 Equivalent Wealth Computations 
Above we argued that risk-averse consumers may value annuities more highly than the 
simple financial money’s worth approach implies since people would be expected to derive utility 
from insurance protection per se.  Is this section we report results on the annuity equivalent 
wealth values, which represent how much wealth a consumer would need, if he did not have 
access to an annuity market, to achieve the same lifetime expected utility level that he could 
achieve if he used that wealth to purchase a nominal annuity. 
  In order to evaluate this measure, we must assume a particular form for the consumer’s 
expected utility function and compare the utility value of full annuitization with no annuitization.  
We conduct these evaluations using a range of risk aversion parameters since there is no clear 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking unisex tables must be used in pricing only the “protected rights” component of the pension system; 




guidance from the literature as to just how risk-averse consumers may be.  We also acknowledge 
that the value of a new life annuity depends on the existence of other types of life income streams.  
This is relevant where an older consumer could anticipate receiving lifelong retirement benefits 
from a company and/or governmental pension program, so the marginal utility of a new life 
annuity would be expected to be less than for someone entirely lacking in access to any retirement 
annuity.
9  
  The results of our analysis appear in Table 12. What the table shows is that annuity 
equivalent wealth values prove to be quite substantial.  Going down the first column, for instance, 
a consumer with a logarithmic utility function (CRRA = 1) and no other pre-existing annuity 
would assess the annuity equivalent wealth of a real life annuity at 1.502.  What this means is that 
this consumer would be indifferent between having $1 in a real lifetime annuity, and $1.50 in non-
annuitized wealth.  At higher levels of risk aversion, the annuity equivalent wealth value rises to 2, 
meaning that access to a real annuity is worth double the wealth that value invested in a nominal 
annuity.  In other words, annuities are valued more highly than in strictly money’s worth terms. 
Table 12 here 
Our results also indicate that a real annuity is worth more than a nominal annuity to the 
risk-averse consumer. Thus with CRRA=1, the consumer would value the real annuity at 5-8 cents 
more on the dollar as compared to a nominal annuity, whereas with CRRA=10, the gap is 40-60 
cents.  The effect differs with the inflation process, however, since the annuity equivalent wealth 
for the consumer is 1.451 in the case of i.i.d. inflation, and 1.424 in the case of persistent inflation. 
                                                 
9 This calculation is carried out by first finding the maximum utility V* the consumer could attain when he can fully 
annuitized his wealth, and then re-computing the dynamic programming problem solving for utility V when annuities 
are not available.  Then one can evaluate the additional wealth (i.e.  DW) that would have to be given to the consumer 
to leave him at an equivalent level of utility: V(W*+  DW|no annuities) = V*, and the annuity equivalent wealth would 
then be a = ((W* + DW)/W*).  For more discussion see Brown (2001). The calculations in Table 12 therefore 
represent not the marginal value placed on the first dollar of an annuity, but the full utility value of annuitization (and 




Not surprisingly the real annuity is more highly valued when the inflation process is more 
persistent.   
It is interesting that the monotonic relationship between annuity equivalent wealth and risk 
aversion does not hold for nominal annuities in the presence of uncertain inflation.  This is 
because risk aversion works in opposing directions in the face of inflation uncertainty.  On the one 
hand, higher risk aversion makes the consumer value an annuitized payout more highly since he 
avoids the risk of outliving his resources, and this is all that matters in the case of the real annuity.  
On the other hand, a risk-averse consumer dislikes the uncertainty introduced into the nominal 
annuity stream by stochastic inflation.  Increased variability in the real value of the nominal 
annuity payouts reduces utility, and this effect is larger for those with the highest degree of risk 
aversion.  At low levels of risk aversion, the first effect dominates, and the annuity equivalent 
wealth for a nominal annuity rises with risk aversion.  For example, moving from CRRA=1 to 
CRRA=2, the annuity equivalent wealth increases from 1.451 to 1.553 in the i.i.d. inflation case, 
and from 1.424 to 1.501 in the persistent inflation case.  However, as risk aversion rises, the 
second effect becomes stronger, and the annuity equivalent wealth begins to decrease with risk 
aversion (BMP forthcoming).   
Our results are also informative regarding how consumers might value annuities if some 
substantial portion of their retirement assets were already annuitized. In the extension of our 
model, we posit that half of retiree wealth is annuitized. This seems reasonable in view of the 
finding that the median US older household holds about this fraction of its retirement resources in 
the form of expected future Social Security benefits, and these are payable only as a real life 
annuity (Moore and Mitchell 2000).  In this case, a consumer who is already half annuitized still 




relatively non-risk-averse half-annuitized consumer (CRRA=1) is indifferent between $1 in a real 
annuity and $1.33 in non-annuitized wealth.  In other words he would require only a 33% 
increment to his wealth to be made as well off as if he had a real annuity, compared to 50% in the 
case where he lacked an annuity altogether.  Clearly having a pre-existing real annuity affords the 
consumer insurance against very low consumption values and drives down the value of additional 
privately-purchased annuities.   
If the annuity on offer were nominal instead of real and inflation followed an i.i.d. process, 
the results prove to be similar.  More striking is the result with persistent inflationary process, 
since at high levels of risk aversion, having a real pre-existing annuity provides insurance against 
very low consumption. Here the utility cost of having persistent high inflation eat into the nominal 
annuity is lower, so his willingness to buy the nominal annuity would be greater.  
Because many investors seem to believe that equity-linked variable annuities are superior 
to traditional nominal annuities, we have also compared annuity equivalent wealth measures for 
these products.  In the US the variable annuity has been around since the 1950’s, initiated by the 
TIAA-CREF and VALIC companies (Brown 2000).  In the UK, “unit-linked” or “with-profit” 
annuities appear to be more recent entrants on the insurance scene (Blake 1999).   
In terms of the retiree’s perception, a higher expected mean return on a variable annuity 
product might make it more appealing, though the greater risk could provide an offset.  To assess 
this tradeoff, we must model the mean return associated with portfolios of risky securities and the 
variability of returns around this mean. Accordingly, we have developed an indexed portfolio of 
common stocks using two alternative assumptions on the mean real return on equities: 6% real 
(i.e., a 3 percent premium over the indexed bond return), and 9% real.  (Both assume an equity 




also assume the standard deviation of real returns on equities equals its historical average value of 
20.9 percent per year.
10  We compare these with fixed real retirement annuities in Table 13. 
Table 13 here 
We give results with and without pre-existing annuitization.  When real returns on equities 
average 6%, the consumer having logarithmic utility would value equity-linked variable payout 
annuities more highly than real annuities.  Without a pre-existing annuity, his annuity equivalent 
wealth from accessing a variable annuity is $1.62, larger than that for the real annuity previously 
described ($1.50).  On the other hand, more risk-averse people who might have placed all their 
wealth in a variable annuity would be worse off than not annuitizing at all.  This can be seen by 
annuity equivalent wealth values below unity.   
   These findings imply that one segment of the older population might favor a variable 
annuity linking payouts to equity returns in retirement, rather than a real annuity. The higher 
anticipated returns from the variable annuity would compensate these consumers for (some of) the 
inflation risk borne.  But more risk-averse retirees would still be expected to prefer a fixed life 
annuity over a variable product (and a real product over a nominal one). 
 
4. Can Annuity Market Performance Be Enhanced? 
  Our analysis thus far indicates that annuities deserve an important role in many retiree  
portfolios. This is particularly evident if government-based social security benefits cannot be 
relied on to support a major portion of old-age consumption.  Nevertheless, people might value 
annuities less than our models imply for several reasons. 
                                                 
10 For further elaboration of the estimating procedure see BMP (2000) and BMPW (forthcoming). Real equity returns 




  One explanation for under-purchase of annuities is that they may be seen as “too 
expensive.” As we have shown, however, adverse selection is rather small in the insurance 
markets examined.  It is true that insurers levy charges to cover administrative costs and insurer 
reserves, contributing to the perception that these products are costly. Yet our analysis indicates 
that in the US and UK at least, these charges are relatively low and appear to be falling over time.  
As a result, the types of loads currently charged by insurers would not be expected to offset the 
substantial utility values associated with insurance against longevity risk. Yet as new markets for 
annuities develop in Europe and Asia, it will be important to pay close attention to loads and 
adverse selection to ensure that these do not discourage market growth unnecessarily.   
  Public policy can also play a key role in structuring the way in which these markets 
develop. In the UK and Sweden, for instance, unisex mortality tables must be used to compute 
pension payouts (for those benefits provided under the “protected rights” legislation). In this 
instance, expected mortality differences between men and women may not be used to price retiree 
payouts differentially. While this produces cross-subsidization between male and female retirees 
on average, it also restricts the amount of adverse selection that occurs at the annuitization stage.  
In the US, while unisex tables are required for employer pension calculations, they are not 
imposed on individual annuitants purchasing their life payouts on the retail market. Furthermore, 
many pension-covered workers are permitted to take a lump sum cashout from the employer 
pension at retirement. As a result, an informed and rational consumer anticipating a shorter life 
expectancy (e.g. a male retiree) has an economic incentive to cash out his employer pension rather 
than take it as a life annuity stream, in order to avoid remaining in the (increasingly female) group 
mortality pool.  In this sense pension and insurance regulations can powerfully affect the appeal of 




  Another factor shaping the demand for annuities is retiree interest in maintaining financial 
liquidity in old age.  Having relatively large amounts of cash on hand is deemed especially 
important in countries such as the US where nursing home benefits are not provided by the 
government as a matter of course.  With over one-quarter of the 65+ population needing long-term 
care at some point and nursing home fees exceeding $50,000 per year, it is not surprising that 
older Americans would want to keep a portion of their assets liquid instead of annuitizing all their 
wealth.  In response, some insurers have begun to devise new financial products that will integrate 
a life annuity with nursing home insurance for the elderly (Warshawsky, Spillman and Murtaugh, 
forthcoming).  The demand for cash in old age is also generating some interest in reverse annuity 
mortgages, financial contracts that allow an older person to obtain an annuity by pledging the net 
equity in his home (Caplin, forthcoming).  Of course, such products have been a “hard sell” since 
the owner-occupied home is often used as a tax-preferred vehicle for bequests.
11   
  Above we argued that sensible regulation and supervision can strengthen the development 
of annuity markets. Conversely, institutional and regulatory problems have sometimes impeded 
their growth (Bodie, Hammond and Mitchell, forthcoming).  For example, in the developing 
country arena, insurers are frequently poorly supervised and regulated, so retirees may not view 
them as reliable institutions for old-age assets (Mitchell 2000a).  In the developed world, 
regulation varies across countries (e.g. within Europe) and by state (in the US) regarding reserve 
and reporting requirements, investment restrictions, guaranty fund programs, and tax policy. This 
makes it difficult for investors and annuity consumers to evaluate insurance competitiveness 
across national boundaries (cf Lemaire, 1997). 
                                                 
11 Among economists there is little agreement over how to model bequests (Gale and Slemrod, forthcoming), so it is 
not clear precisely how the bequest motive should be incorporated into a model of the demand for annuities.  Brown 
(2001) argues that most specifications imply that full annuitization is no longer optimal.  To the extent that some 
people may be over-annuitized (e.g. through Social Security), purchase of life insurance may be beneficial.  Further 




   Another area where policymakers can fundamentally influence annuity market functioning 
is in the intersection between public and private old-age programs.  For example Doyle, Mitchell 
and Piggott (2001) devise annuity loadings for Australia and Singapore and find adverse selection 
far stronger in Australia.  This difference is attributed, in part, to the existence of a means-tested 
and quite generous old-age safety net in Australia, while no minimum consumption is guaranteed 
in Singapore. In other words, the extent to which people seek to annuitize retirement 
accumulations from defined contribution plans will be influenced by guarantees offered by the 
public sector.   
  When enumerating possible obstacles to annuity markets, the discussion would be 
incomplete without recognizing that older people might be laboring under some misinformation 
regarding the relative advantage of annuity investments versus other financial products. For one 
thing, people might underestimate their longevity prospects which would lead them to undervalue 
protection against longevity.  In fact however, survey evidence suggests that older people are quite 
well-informed about their survival probabilities, and their expected survival patterns track 
actuarial tables quite closely (Hurd and McGarry, 1995).  Of course there remains the problem of 
cohort mortality risk: that is, if an entire cohort lives longer than anticipated by those selling the 
products, insuring firms would experience excess costs. Some have argued that this problem can 
best be resolved by having governments issue “survivor bonds” inasmuch as private insurers have 
no financial mechanism adequate to diversity this type of risk (Blake, Burrows, and Orszag, 
forthcoming). A similar argument was made by financial experts and economists seeking to 
encourage the US government to issue inflation-linked bonds (Brynjolfosson and Fabozzi, 1999).  
Retiree demand for these products in the US has been modest but of course inflation has been very 




become a mandatory component of the retiree portfolio and demand for these assets has been more 
substantial.   
  A final factor driving the size and development of annuity markets is how people feel 
about alternative investments. Retirees may believe that they can manage their money better than 
do institutional investors, a perspective that may have contributed to what the British have called 
pension “misselling.” Here participants in company-based defined benefit plans switched their DB 
accruals into individual-account defined contribution plans at the behest of insurers and other 
financial advisers, and in some cases this switch proved financially deleterious (Ward, 1996). At 
issue and still not unsettled in this arena is how well those who switched plans understood what 
the switch meant, including their foregone defined benefit plan accrual and differences in how 
longevity risk was handled in the two environments.   
  Due to adverse selection in annuity markets, as well as participant inability to make 
informed decisions on retirement decumulation, some policymakers have argued that all pension 
participants should be required to annuitize at least a portion of their assets at retirement.
12  For 
this reason it is of interest to examine the case of Chile, which more than two decades ago closed 
down its traditional national pay-as-you-go defined benefit program in favor of a mandatory 
defined contribution individual accounts system.  As such, Chile is providing an interesting test-
case for those seeking to design better old-age retirement programs.  Of particular interest in the 
present context is the way in which the retirement asset decumulation process is working, now that 
the Chilean system has been in place long enough to have people reaching retirement age with a 
reasonably long working career under the new program.  Thus far, early retirees and disabled 
persons constitute the bulk of the retired population: only 38% of program affiliates in payment 
                                                 
12 For example several members of the 1994-6 Social Security Advisory Council in the US urged mandating annuities 





status left work via regular retirement, while 45% were early retirees and 17% were on disability 
(Diaz and Edwards 1999). Of most interest, however, are the payout patterns. With over a decade 
of data available, it appears that a minority -- 40% -- of Chilean beneficiaries have elected a life 
annuity, while 60% opted for the “programmed withdrawal” or graduated payment approach that 
does not guarantee benefits for life (see Figure 2). While the fraction of recipients electing life 
annuities has grown over time, these are mostly early rather than normal retirees.  Whether and 
how annuity pricing policy under the Chilean system and other national, mandatory, defined 
contribution pension programs influences these outcomes are a subject deserving of further study. 
Figure 2 here 
 
5. Final Thoughts 
This overview of annuity market functioning suggests several lessons.  One is that annuity 
products have an important role to play in helping people manage their assets into retirement. Risk 
averse individuals will value annuities at well above their purchase price. We also find that that 
adverse selection is not large and insurance loadings have been falling over time, in countries 
where we have had adequate data to measure these.   Last, there is a wide range of annuity 
products that can enhance retirement security. Here we emphasize the role of inflation-indexed 
annuities and related products protecting real consumption streams into very old age. 
  Without a doubt, many developed and developing nations will face the need to restructure 
their retirement systems in the next two decades: Germany has already made some progress in this 
vein, Greece is confronting political pressures around this topic, and the US has announced a new 
effort to examine individual accounts. During this reform process, it will be critical to devote 




security during a long retirement period requires more attention to the long-term consequences of 
regulatory, financial, and social insurance programs than has heretofore been noted by most 
reformers.  Additional study would be helpful on the risks affecting retiree consumption and how 
people can make better-informed decisions about decumulating assets in retirement.  New 
financial products to help retirees draw down their lifetime savings more sensibly would be 
helpful, but with them arise new challenges for financial system and insurance regulators.     
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Table 1. Components of Household Wealth on the Verge of Retirement: US Health and 
Retirement Study ($1992) 
 
      Projected   Projected  
Wealth     Current  Wealth at  Wealth at 
Decile    Wealth  Age  62  Age  65 
Mean    $478,313  $566,431  $625,066 
  -Housing  65,940  76,410  80,507 
  -Financial  175,974  205,653  228,133 
  -Social Security  119,793  128,712  142,018 
  -Pension  116,606  155,656  174,408 
Median 10%  $325,157  $382,678  $420,537 
  -Housing  59,746  71,097  75,047 
  -Financial  66,530  71,004  71,175 
  -Social Security  133,606  143,864  160,824 
  -Pension  65,275  96,713  113,491 
Source: Moore and Mitchell (2000).   





Table 2:  Remaining Life Expectancy and Probabilities of Survival to Selected Ages for 65-
Year Old Men and Women in the Year 2000 
 
  Men  Women 






Probability of Surviving to Age:     
70  88%  92% 
75  74  82 
80  56  69 
85  36  51 
90  18  31 
95  6  14 
100  1  4 
 





Table 3:  Average Nominal Monthly Annuity Payouts on Single-Premium Immediate 
Annuities Offered to 65-Year Old Men & Women: US Individual (Retail) Market 1995-1999   
 
Best’s Survey  Annuity Shopper   
1995  1996  1997  1998  1998  1999 
Men     $7.94  $7.62  $7.72  $7.33  $7.32  $7.35 
Women  7.17  6.86  7.00  6.62  6.59  6.67 
Source:  Derived from Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (forthcoming). Each entry indicates the 
monthly income per $1,000 based on the purchase of a $100,000 single premium immediate life 





Table 4.   Average Real and Nominal Monthly Annuity Payouts on Single -Premium Immediate 
Annuities Offered to Men and Women, by Age:  UK Compulsory Pension Market 1998 
    ______________________________________________________          
      Age 60      Age 65      Age 70 
    ______________________________________________________ 
A. Nominal Annuity Benefit: 
Men      £6.66      £7.55        £8.73  
Women      6.03      6.67       7.61  
    ______________________________________________________  
B. Real Annuity Benefit: 
Men      4.76      5.63       6.80  
Women      4.17      4.83       5.75    
    ______________________________________________________  
Source:  Derived from Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (2000). Each entry indicates the monthly 
income per £1,000 premium, based on the purchase of a per £100,000 single premium immediate 





T. 5:  Average Nominal Monthly Annuity Payouts on Single-Premium Immediate Annuities 
Offered to Men and Women at age 55: Singapore and Australia  2000 
 
  Australia  Singapore 
Men  $8.46  $7.98 
Women  7.94  7.09 
Source: Derived from Doyle, Mitchell and Piggott (2001). Assumed nominal interest rate 5 
percent in Singapore and 6.96 percent in Australia, consistent with historical trend. Each entry 
indicates the monthly income per $1,000 premium, based on the purchase of a per $100,000 single 





Table 6:  Comparing Mortality Patterns Across Countries: Cohort Results for the US & the 
UK  
 
A. Annuitants conditional on attaining age 65   
    A/E(%)  A/E(%)  IRR(%)  IRR(%) 
    1  2  3  4 
    Men   Women  Men  Women 
US 
 
69.0  55.3  6.55%  7.20% 
UK 
 
82.3  55.9  5.92%  7.23% 
%(US-
UK)/US 
(19.28)  (3.2)    (3.2) 
B. Population conditional on attaining age 65 
US    93.9  62.9  5.24%  6.79% 
UK    98.3  65.8  5.05%  6.74% 
%(US-
UK)/US 
(4.43)  (4.40)  18.3  4.6 
Source: Derived from Mitchell and McCarthy (2001). 
Notes: Data on compulsory annuitants for the UK refer to those compelled to annuitize a certain 
fraction of pension benefits; in the US, data cover pensioners in retirement plans. Columns 1 and 3 
use US male population period mortality as reference category, while columns 2 and 4 assume a 
5% return for base annuity. 




Table 7:  Money’s Worth of Nominal Annuity Payouts, Men age 65, UK and US  
(Using population mortality tables) 
 __________________________________________________ 
Money’s Worth  Retail      Tax-qualified 
By Age:    Annuity   Annuity*       
 __________________________________________________ 
A. US (1998):   
Men: 
  Age 65    0.835    0.850      
Women: 
  Age 65    0.888    0.875      
 __________________________________________________ 
 
B. UK (1998):   
Men: 
  Age 65    0.861    0.901      
Women: 
  Age 65    0.851    0.902      
 __________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Panel A: Poterba and Warshawsky (1999: T2).  Panel B. Finklestein and Poterba (1999: 
34-5). Panel C: Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (1999).  
Notes: All results use Treasury interest rates and population mortality tables.  *Refers to 




Table 8.  Money’s Worth of US Nominal Annuity Payouts Using Population and Annuitant 
Mortality Tables, After-Tax Calculations  (US 1995) 
________________________________________________________________ 
           Mortality Table Employed 
        Population     Annuitant  
________________________________________________________________ 
A. Men: 
Age   55      0.852       0.934        
   65      0.814       0.927        
   75      0.783       0.913        
B. Women: 
 Age  55      0.880       0.937        
   65      0.854       0.927        
   75      0.846       0.919        
________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999).  






Table 9:  Comparative Evidence on Money’s Worth of Nominal Annuity Payouts: Single 
Premium Nominal Life Annuities Offered to 65-Year Olds 
 
 
           UK    Australia      Canada            Switzerland 
Mort. Table:  Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann  Pop  Ann 
 
Men  0.897  0.966  0.914  0.986  0.925  1.014  0.965  NA 
Women  0.910  0.957  0.914  0.970  0.937  1.015  1.115  NA 
 
 




Table 10: Expected Discounted Values for Nominal and Real Annuities, UK and US 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Money’s Worth   Nominal   Real 
By Age:    Annuity  Annuity          
__________________________________________________ 
A. Compulsory UK Market (1998) 
Men: 
   60    0.921     0.867              
   65    0.908     0.854              
   70    0.889     0.836              
Women: 
   60    0.928     0.876            
   65    0.907      0.857              
  70    0.886    0.836 
B. US Retail Market (1998) 
Men: 
  65    0.864     0.702              
   75    0.830     0.720              
Women: 
  65    0.889      0.708              
  75    0.887    0.762 
__________________________________________________ 
Source: Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (forthcoming) Computations use population mortality table 





Table 11: Money’s Worth for Nominal and Real Annuities by Ethnicity (US 1998) 
________________________________________________________________ 
Money’s Worth  Nominal   Real 
By Ethnicity:    Annuity  Annuity          
________________________________________________________________ 
Men:      
   White    0.947     0.930              
   Black    0.873     0.847              
   Hispanic  1.027     1.024              
Women:   
  White    1.059     1.077              
   Black    0.994     1.003              
   Hispanic  1.105     1.136              
________________________________________________________________ 
 Source: Brown (2000). Computations use age/sex/race population mortality tables derived by 
author and Treasury rate.   




 Table 12: Annuity Equivalent Wealth for Real and Nominal Annuities  
 
Consumer with No Pre-Existing 
Annuity Wealth 
Consumer With Half of Initial 



























1  1.502  1.451  1.424  1.330  1.304  1.286 
2  1.650  1.553  1.501  1.441  1.403  1.366 
5  1.855  1.616  1.487  1.623  1.515  1.450 
10  2.004  1.592  1.346  1.815  1.577  1.451 
Source: Derived from Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (forthcoming).   
Note:  The annuity equivalent wealth calculation for the nominal annuity assumes inflation takes 
one of six possible values, roughly capturing the distribution of inflation outcomes over the 1926-
1997 period. Inflation shocks are assumed independent across periods in the i.i.d. case and follow 




Table 13: Annuity Equivalent Wealth for Equity-Linked Variable Annuity Products 
 
No Pre-Existing Annuities  Pre-Existing Annuity Equal to Half 













                                                         Annuity Equivalent Wealth 
1  1.623  2.024  1.567  1.953 
2  1.499  1.901  1.570  1.957 
5  0.921  1.355  1.443  1.789 
10  0.331  0.622  1.261  1.563 
Source: Derived from Brown, Mitchell, & Poterba (forthcoming).   








Table 14. Pattern of Retired Affiliates in the Chilean Pension System: Affiliates by Type, 
1998 
    ________________________________________________________________ 
 
          Men    Women    Total           % of Total 
    ________________________________________________________________ 
 
Retired Affiliates          
Regular Retirement Age   82,606    57,331   122,357  38.27% 
Early Retirement Age   122,357     20,052   142,409  44.55% 
  Disabled Affiliates    42,566     12,349    54,915  17.18% 
  Total Affiliates    247,529    89,732   319,681 
    ________________________________________________________________ 




Figure 1.  Distribution of Age at Death: US Male Population vs Annuitant Mortality 























































































Figure 2. Distribution of Payouts by Type, Chilean Pension System, 1988-1997 
Source: Derived from Diaz and Edwards (1999)
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